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Martin Heidegger - Humano, demasiado humano

MARTIN HEIDEGGER- HUMANO, DEMASIADO HUMANO

Plato: The Allegory of the Cave

JUEVES, 7 DE FEBRERO DE 2013

Plato: The Allegory of the Cave

Or "the Myth of the Cavern". A famous passage from the Republic. I quote (and correct a bit) from Reading about the World vol. 1, which establishes an analogy between Plato's cave and contemporary film spectatorship:
Editors' comments:

Plato, the most creative and influential of Socrates' disciples, wrote dialogues, in which he frequently used the figure of Socrates to espouse his own (Plato's) full-fledged philosophy. In "The Republic," Plato sums up his views in an image of ignorant humanity, trapped in the depths and not even aware of its own limited perspective. 
shadowplayThe rare individual escapes the limitations of that cave and, through a long, tortuous intellectual journey, discovers a higher realm, a true reality, with a final, almost mystical awareness of Goodness as the origin of everything that exists. Such a person is then the best equipped to govern in society, having a knowledge of what is ultimately most worthwhile in life and not just a knowledge of techniques; but that person will frequently be misunderstood by those ordinary folks back in the cave who haven't shared in the intellectual insight. If he were living today, Plato might replace his rather awkward cave metaphor with a movie theater, with the projector replacing the fire, the film replacing the objects which cast shadows, the shadows on the cave wall with the projected movie on the screen, and the echo with the loudspeakers behind the screen. The essential point is that the prisoners in the cave are not seeing reality, but only a shadowy representation of it. The importance of the allegory lies in Plato's belief that there are invisible truths lying under the apparent surface of things which only the most enlightened can grasp. Used to the world of illusion in the cave, the prisoners at first resist enlightenment, as students resist education. But those who can achieve enlightenment deserve to be the leaders and rulers of all the rest. At the end of the passage, Plato expresses another of his favorite ideas: that education is not a process of putting knowledge into empty minds, but of making people realize that which they already know. This notion that truth is somehow embedded in our minds was also powerfully influential for many centuries.

Judging by this passage, why do you think many people in the democracy of Athens might have been antagonistic to Plato's ideas? Is a resident of the cave (a prisoner, as it were) likely to want to make the ascent to the outer world? Why or why not? What does the sun symbolize in the allegory? 
 
—oOo— 
 


From the Republic, Book VII:

 And now, I said, let me show in a figure how far our nature is enlightened or unenlightened:--Behold! human beings living in an underground den, which has a mouth open towards the light and reaching all along the den; here they have been from their childhood, and have their legs and necks chained so that they cannot move, and can only see before them, being prevented by the chains from turning round their heads. Above and behind them a fire is blazing at a distance, and between the fire and the prisoners there is a raised way; and you will see, if you look, a low wall built along the way, like the screen which marionette players have in front of them, over which they show the puppets.

I see.

And do you see, I said, men passing along the wall carrying all sorts of vessels, and statues and figures of animals made of wood and stone and various materials, which appear over the wall? Some of them are talking, others silent.

You have shown me a strange image, and they are strange prisoners.

Like ourselves, I replied; and they see only their own shadows, or the shadows of one another, which the fire throws on the opposite wall of the cave?

True, he said; how could they see anything but the shadows if they were never allowed to move their heads?

And of the objects which are being carried in like manner they would only see the shadows?
 
indonesian shadow play
Yes, he said.

And if they were able to converse with one another, would they not suppose that they were naming what was actually before them?

Very true.

And suppose further that the prison had an echo which came from the other side, would they not be sure to fancy when one of the passers-by spoke that the voice which they heard came from the passing shadow?

No question, he replied.

To them, I said, the truth would be literally nothing but the shadows of the images.

That is certain.

And now look again, and see what will naturally follow if the prisoners are released and disabused of their error. At first, when any of them is liberated and compelled suddenly to stand up and turn his neck round and walk and look towards the light, he will suffer sharp pains; the glare will distress him, and he will be unable to see the realities of which in his former state he had seen the shadows; and then conceive some one saying to him, that what he saw before was an illusion, but that now, when he is approaching nearer to being and his eye is turned towards more real existence, he has a clearer vision,--what will be his reply? And you may further imagine that his instructor is pointing to the objects as they pass and requiring him to name them,--will he not be perplexed? Will he not fancy that the shadows which he formerly saw are truer than the objects which are now shown to him?

Far truer.

And if he is compelled to look straight at the light, will he not have a pain in his eyes which will make him turn away to take refuge in the objects of vision which he can see, and which he will conceive to be in reality clearer than the things which are now being shown to him?

True, he said.

And suppose once more, that he is reluctantly dragged up a steep and rugged ascent, and held fast until he is forced into the presence of the sun himself, is he not likely to be pained and irritated? When he approaches the light his eyes will be dazzled, and he will not be able to see anything at all of what are now called realities.

Not all in a moment, he said.

He will require to grow accustomed to the sight of the upper world. And first he will see the shadows best, next the reflections of men and other objects in the water, and then the objects themselves; then he will gaze upon the light of the moon and the stars and the spangled heaven; and he will see the sky and the stars by night better than the sun or the light of the sun by day?

Certainly.

Last of all he will be able to see the sun, and not mere reflections of him in the water, but he will see him in his own proper place, and not in another; and he will contemplate him as he is.

Certainly.

He will then proceed to argue that this is he who gives the season and the years, and is the guardian of all that is in the visible world, and in a certain way the cause of all things which he and his fellows have been accustomed to behold?

Clearly, he said, he would first see the sun and then reason about him.

And when he remembered his old habitation, and the wisdom of the den and his fellow-prisoners, do you not suppose that he would felicitate himself on the change, and pity them?

Certainly, he would.

And if they were in the habit of conferring honors among themselves on those who were quickest to observe the passing shadows and to remark which of them went before, and which followed after, and which were together; and who were therefore best able to draw conclusions as to the future, do you think that he would care for such honors and glories, or envy the possessors of them? Would he not say with Homer,

Better to be the poor servant of a poor master, and to endure anything, rather than think as they do and live after their manner? (1)

Yes, he said, I think that he would rather suffer anything than entertain these false notions and live in this miserable manner.

Imagine once more, I said, such a one coming suddenly out of the sun to be replaced in his old situation; would he not be certain to have his eyes full of darkness?

To be sure, he said.
shadow wall
And if there were a contest, and he had to compete in measuring the shadows with the prisoners who had never moved out of the den, while his sight was still weak, and before his eyes had become steady (and the time which would be needed to acquire this new habit of sight might be very considerable), would he not be ridiculous? Men would say of him that up he went and down he came without his eyes; (2)and that it was better not even to think of ascending; and if any one tried to loose another and lead him up to the light, let them only catch the offender, and they would put him to death. (3)

No question, he said.

This entire allegory, I said, you may now append, dear Glaucon, to the previous argument; the prison-house is the world of sight, the light of the fire is the sun, and you will not misapprehend me if you interpret the journey upwards to be the ascent of the soul into the intellectual world according to my poor belief, which, at your desire, I have expressed--whether rightly or wrongly God knows. But whether true or false, my opinion is that in the world of knowledge the idea of good appears last of all, and is seen only with an effort; and, when seen, is also inferred to be the universal author of all things beautiful and right, parent of light and of the lord of light in this visible world (4), and the immediate source of reason and truth in the intellectual; and that this is the power upon which he would act rationally either in public or private life must have his eye fixed.

I agree, he said, as far as I am able to understand you.

 
Moreover, I said, you must not wonder that those who attain to this beatific vision are unwilling to descend to human affairs; for their souls are ever hastening into the upper world where they desire to dwell; which desire of theirs is very natural, if our allegory may be trusted.

Yes, very natural.

And is there anything surprising in one who passes from divine contemplations to the evil state of man, misbehaving himself in a ridiculous manner; if, while his eyes are blinking and before he has become accustomed to the surrounding darkness, he is compelled to fight in courts of law, or in other places, about the images or the shadows of images of justice, and is endeavoring to meet the conception of those who have never yet seen absolute justice?

Anything but surprising, he replied.

Any one who has common sense will remember that the bewilderments of the eyes are of two kinds, and arise from two causes, either from coming out of the light or from going into the light, which is true of the mind's eye; and he who remembers this when he sees any one whose vision is perplexed and weak, will not be too ready to laugh; he will first ask whether that soul of man has come out of the brighter life, and is unable to see because unaccustomed to the dark, or having turned from darkness to the day is dazzled by excess of light. And he will count the one happy in his condition and state of being, and he will pity the other; or, if he have a mind to laugh at the soul which comes from below into the light, there will be more reason in this than in the laugh which greets him who returns from above out of the light into the den.

That, he said, is a very just distinction.

But then, if I am right, certain professors of education must be wrong when they say that they can put a knowledge into the soul which was not there before, like sight into blind eyes.

They undoubtedly say this, he replied.

Whereas our argument shows that the power and capacity of learning exists in the soul already; and that just as the eye was unable to turn from darkness to light without the whole body, so too the instrument of knowledge can only by the movement of the whole soul be turned from the world of becoming into that of being, and learn by degrees to endure the sight of being and of the brightest and best of being, or in other words, of the good.
 
—oOo—

Translated by Benjamin Jowett

(1) This refers to a famous passage in Homer's Odyssey in which the ghost of the great hero Achilles, when asked if he is not proud of the fame his deeds has spread throughout the world, answers that he would rather be a slave on a worn-out farm than king over all of the famous dead. Interestingly, Plato quotes the same passage elsewhere as disapprovingly as depicting life after death in such a negative manner that it may undermine the willingness of soldiers to die in war.

(2) The comic playwright Aristophanes had mocked Socrates by portraying Plato's master, Socrates, as a foolish intellectual with his head in the clouds.

(3) Plato undoubtedly has in mind the fact that the Athenians had condemned to death his master Socrates, whom Plato considered supremely enlightened.

(4) 
Here Plato describes his notion of God in a way that was influence profoundly Christian theologians.



—oOo—

The dialogue takes place between "Socrates" and Plato's puppet Glaucon. Now that I mention puppets—note that there is a feedback here between the notions of reality and representation, one which pertains to the very notion of representation. (See a Shakespearean analogue here). The editors see an analogy between Plato's cavern and the film screen, "had Plato been living today", and indeed the myth may serve as a primal scene in film theory. Or dramatic theory, or theory of the spectacle, because (note well) the idea for the shadows on the wall already originates, as Socrates' analogy makes clear, in a theatrical spectacle—the cavern wall being like "the screen which marionette players have in front of them, over which they show the puppets". cave of forgotten dreamsOne suspects that Socrates or Plato had been attending one of these spectacles at night, illuminated by a fire at the back the audience, and had somehow been more attentive to the shadows projected spontaneously by the audience, and the shadow play being shown on this proto-cinematic screen, than to the puppets above the screen. Or perhaps it is the unexpected and serendipitous conjunction of these two modes of representation, the theatrical one and the proto-cinematic images on the screen, and the wobble or fluctuation in reality and attention caused by their simultaneity and the interaction of several modes of reality and images of the same, which made the fire of an idea light up in the cavern of Plato's brain, and intuit the dialectical feedback or paradoxical Escher-like circulation existing between so-called reality and its representations.


______


Werner Herzog's Cave of Forgotten Dreams is a documentary film on the Paleolithic paintings of the Chauvet cave, whose walls contain some of the oldest symbolic objects of mankind, three hundred centuries ago. The play of volumes and fire lights on the paintings creates a certain illusion of movement, "a kind of proto-cinema" according to Herzog, to which is added the dynamic positions of the animals and the multiple lines suggesting the movement of legs or the head in some figures.  Paleoanthropologists also suggest that the play of human shadows on the walls of caves must have been one of the earliest forms of theatrical spectacle—the shadowplay, act
ually a mixture of projection and physical presence, perhaps joined to shamanic rituals in which animals were impersonated. Thus we find at the origins of drama, that powerfully reflexive symbolic ritual, a situation strongly reminiscent of the one described by Plato in his allegory of the cave. The image of the cave seems particularly appropriate, at this inaugural allegory of the birth of philosophy, and resonates with an echo coming from that time of forgotten dreams in which the symbolic world of myths had to be created, long before it might be deconstructed by the philosopher.


Narración, interpretación, retroacción

MARTES, 5 DE FEBRERO DE 2013

Narración, interpretación, retroacción


Una línea de investigación que defino así, para un Pro-jecto de 
Antropología y Hermenéutica:

Consiste en un estudio de las dimensiones narrativas de la experiencia y de su representación cognitiva o textual, en especial de la dialéctica de prospección y retrospección.  Aunque el núcleo de la reflexión se centra en el análisis de textos propiamente narrativos y en la teorización del mismo (teoría narratológica), es pertinente asimismo el estudio hermenéutico de los elementos de narratividad, o aspectos narrativos, retrospectivos, o de configuración de la experiencia temporal, en textos críticos, ensayísticos, o antropológicos. Se prestará especial atención a los conceptos de perspectivismo retrospectivo y de distorsión retrospectiva, así como a los efectos de retroacción cognitiva a que dan lugar.

John Searle: Consciousness and Causality

SÁBADO, 2 DE FEBRERO DE 2013

John Searle -Consciousness and Causality








And NOT LEAST, Susan Greenfield,  How Does the Brain Generate Consciousness?

 
Narrative defined (neurologically) as "input of pre-frontal cortex"—related to one of the two modes of brain functioning, what Bickerton called "offline thought", with low sensory input and high cognitive activity, based on secondary brain circuits, and reliance of previous associations rather than direct sensory input.

La idea de la Guerra desde el materialismo filosófico




Tiene Bueno una idea de lo que es el Estado demasiado idealizada, como si fuese un sistema racional en el que se puede fundamentar el Derecho, etc.  Como si no hubiese contradicciones objetivas también en los Estados.

Desacredita también a la etología como la filosofía última de la guerra, sólo porque hay otras perspectivas no reducibles a ella. Pero es que hay unas perspectivas más básicas o fundamentales que otras, y la economía, religión, economía, teoría militar, estratética, etc. de la guerra, han de explicarse con una comprensión previa de la etología humana. La teoría del cierre categorial, si se entiende como una manera de aislar las disciplinas en sí mismas, sin atender a la fundamentación de unas explicaciones en el marco de otras, tendrá unas limitaciones inherentes.  Eso mismo le lleva a rechazar acertadamente carácter trascendental o metafísico a la categoría de la guerra, que la saca absurdamente de su propia definición en el nivel de fundamentación que le corresponde propiamente, distinguiendo entre usos literales y metafóricos.  Pero el lugar donde la ubica propiamente es como fenómeno político, con lo cual restringe inadecuadamente (e incoherentemente) su análisis, e impide conceptualizar la violencia de grupo más allá de la categoría del Estado.


Somos hijos de la guerra




Filosofía de las relaciones

Conferencia de Gustavo Bueno:


 


Interesante la crítica que hace Bueno a la cosmología como ambiciosa ciencia del universo, ciencia frustrada e imposible según Bueno. Aquí disiento—aun estando de acuerdo con él en su crítica a las cosmologías variables y gratuitas. Tenemos que partir de una ciencia de la realidad humana (incluyendo las relaciones humanas) y fundar sobre esa ciencia el conocimiento del universo o los universos que la rodean. La realidad inmediata es la realidad fundamental. Pero sobre ella sí se funda una ciencia global del universo, y una ciencia de las distintas maneras de pensar el universo, y de la ubicación de los mundos imaginarios humanos en relación unos a otros.

Es bueno Bueno señalando contradicciones e incoherencias, pero hay que pasar por alto sus propios maximalismos y contradicciones. O apreciaciones selectivas. Por ejemplo, la idea monista de Parménides es contradictoria, pero esto no lo dice Bueno. Si el Ser es uno y uniforme, y no relacional, no puede tener forma de esfera—ni forma alguna, de hecho—cosa que parece evidente, aunque no a Parménides. (Y a Bueno... ¡según le dé el viento!).

Teoría paranoica de la observación mutua


The enigma of awareness (of awareness)

31/10/12


Consciousness as simplification, of decision, of making the world manageable. (See my theory on Attention). And then, the mystery of our awareness of this process, the reflexivity of the whole. With Zizek:





"The subordinate mediator becomes the subject". That seems to be a quite general law governing human action and attention, or, to be more precise, what becomes the subject (and the object of attention) is a successful subordinate mediator.


In this respect, we might consider Malabou’s reading of Hegel’s linguistic anthropology: "Chapter 3 [of The Future of Hegel] then raises the question: if humans are not the only animals that develop habits, what is it that gives us a capacity for self-determination that other animals lack? Chapter 4 responds that the use of language differentiates human beings from other animals and makes our habitual behavior unique: "Man is exemplary because the human formative power can translate the logical process into a sensuous form" (74). This, Malabou concludes, makes each of us capable of plastic individuality, of transforming our own singular essence in unforeseeable ways by incorporating what was formerly accidental."

Note btw that Malabou’s reading is consistent with my own view of Hegel as a demythologizer in religion, and as a philosopher who acknowledges the productive dimension of reflexivity.


____


Zizek: "History means there is no metalanguage" —you cannot stand on your own shoulders, cognitively speaking, and any panorama of philosophy, any reading of another philosophy, is done from a situated philosophical standpoint. For Hegel, the meaning of an act arises through the act itself; meaning is not pre-existing: it is created retroactively. History is one big process of exaptation.

Acercándonos al saber absoluto


Slavoj Zizek: The Return to Hegel


A rambling lecture on Hegel and historicity (& Marxism & Malebranche & Masturbation, etc.), with an emphasis on the retroactive dimension of the historical process, which is what I'm interested in:


"You can only discover a necessity retroactively"."Necessities only take place retroactively". "Once things happen, then they become necessary" (3rd video).


Something unique happened in Hegel: post-Hegelian philosophy is an attempt to obliterate what Hegel did, in part by constructing a ridiculous image of Hegel—a kind of screen memory which conceals a (Lacanian) traumatic excess.

The beginnings of the anti-Idealist critique of Hegel in Schelling: the Idea is a secondary process, the natural process including the unconscious & the world's body so to speak is the primary process. (Of course one can argue that Hegel's perspectival focus on the idea is an axiomatic perspectival choice, a focus of attention).







Kant: "Man is an animal who needs a master" to tame a certain excess of non-natural instinct (what Freud calls the "death drive" or immortality, something that insists beyond life and death). It's not that culture breaks with nature, there is in between these instincts which are no longer purely animal, the death drive, the sex drive...

We humans do many things which do not have a utilitarian value (Zizek is looking for the word exaptation, spandrels, etc.—mixing it up a bit with the concept of sexual selection). Pinker and the "chocolate fudge" idea of the mind, exaptation gone wild. Our mind did not emerge to understand itself, Pinker says, but to deal with practical purposes. But we do bother about impossible tasks from the very beginning, metaphysics, philosophy.  All great inventions emerge from an unusual logic of discoverty: you invent something out of metaphysical speculation, and later practical uses appear. It doesn't work the Marxist way.

(And I suppose that's the beginning of a return to Hegel).

Humans internalize desire in an irrational way—not like the apes' rational choice or partners— humans stick it out to the end, in an irrational way. The other world, immortality, the Undead... Freud's problem was to deal with that, that excess of desire.  What Zizek tries to do is to combine German idealism and Freudianism—not in order to demean German idealism, but to raise Freud to the category of a philosophical thinker.

For Hegel, Kant's recognition of an excess of negativity is not just a starting point which then leads to perfect reconciliation.  NO. Hegel does not believe in the possibility of perfect reconciliation. Radical negativity, excess, is everywhere, it explodes again and again. It is neither nature nor culture— but it is the engine of the Hegelian progress. Once you are in culture, you retroactively de-naturalize nature. Culture becomes a suicidal, repetitive drive, which needs to be reacted against. E.g. in sexuality—derived into foreplay, denaturalization, masturbation, etc.; what is peripheral tends to become central. 

The example of Leader's psychoanalytical patient's slip of the tongue, taking a woman to dinner, said to the waiter "bed for two"—Leader's interpretation is that the slip of tongue is due to a defense against enjoying too much the foreplay, a protest against the logic of the deviation of desire so to speak.

Hegel's critique of concrete universality: he believes that the concrete content of the world derives from the universal notion. (I.e. his idealism). Zizek explains this via Deleuze's anti-Hegelian concept of repetition. Deleuze claims that the new emerges out of absolute repetition. (The example of a new melody arising virtually out of the pure repetition of a melody by a virtuoso pianist playing Augenmusik). What changes is what you don't hear, what is written only for the eyes. This is what Deleuze means by virtuality. In the same way, the ideological revolution consists in changing the implicit rules, the background, even if we say the same thing the virtual resonance is a different one.

I suppose this radical change can be linked to what he says before about historicity—not possible to think again the same after Hegel (or composing the same way after Schoenberg, as Adorno said).

Another example of Deleuze's virtuality: a bad book by Doctorow adapted by a bad film nonetheless gives rise to a virtual effect: through the (bad) film we (retroactively) intuit the good book which should have existed but didn't, except now, in a virtual state. (One might add here Benjamin's notion of the original modified by the translation, or the deconstructive meanings identified by De Man I comment upon here). (Later Zizek brings up another example of  virtuality from Benjamin: the meanings of works of art which can arise only with historical distance, as they are snapshots for which de developing technique has not been yet invented).

Yet another example: Bergson's fascination with the fact that a war (1st WW) could actually emerge, from a collective idea, only an idea, to an actual reality—reality as a shock in its actual efficiency. What was thought but seemed impossible, suddenly becomes possible and necessary, in a retroactive way. (Like Zizek's military service: actually being there and its naturalization). Bergson's beautiful formula:  not a standard linear logic of a possibility among many becoming actualized, but rather...

... something that we considered (symbolically) impossible actually happens, (—pongamos la independencia de Cataluña, por imaginar—) and then, when it happens, it becomes possible.

This is the best definition of what Lacan calls an act: something which seems impossible when it happens, but retroactively creates its own conditions of possibility. E.g. Nixon's visit to China.

Bergson's formulation: a reality inserts itself into the past as a possibility, farther and farther, it inserts itself as having been possible all the time, but only when it emerges it begins to "always already have been" (Two Sources of Morality and Religion).  The example of being in love: your previous life is structured as if waiting for this moment. Jean-Pierre Dupuy's notion on the theory of confronting catastrophes: one must accept them as inevitable and change the very past, working retroactively.  (Muy en línea con mi propia teoría de las catástrofes). Hegel too: in development a thing becomes what it already was. (Well, that's a way of reading him—perhaps he's actually failing to articulate the retroactive argument, but he says it NOW, in a way, you know, retroactively...).

(And now Zizek goes on to quote T. S. Eliot, and borges,  etc.—pity David Lodge didn't get credit for that! or myself, since we're at it, Borges & Kafka & the rest. Really we're treading the same ground, only I "been there, done that" in the 1990s...)

"Tradition and the Individutal Talent" as read by Zizek: radical change restructures not just the present but the past as well.  Any radical event radically recreates its own possibility. Hegel's historical idealism means not only that you are influenced by the past: you change the past, not the real past, but the past as it exists now.

The properly Hegelian interpretation of the relationship between necessity and contingency. Not "reality is necessary but it realizes itself in contingent ways" i.e. "a necessity of contingency"—this is a vulgar Marxist interpretation, e.g. Napoleon as a contingent historical figure which embodies a historical necessity. Instead, the deeper Hegelian insight is the contingency of necessity.  Things become necessary in a way which is ultimately contingent.  The necessity emerges retroactively.

"Judith Butler's" question: Is Zizek retroactively creating the Hegel he needs? (Listen to the solution, between the lines:)

If you come too close to things, reality blurs. Both in video games and in reality. Some aspects of reality have been left "unprogrammed". The best argument against reductionism, is that you cannot reduce indefinitely, things get blurry. If there's a lesson in Heisenberg etc. it's the incompleteness of reality itself. And this is the basic recognition of Hegel's, his basic operation: our epistemological limitation; we solve the problem not by solving it, but by showing how the problem itself is its own solution.


Let's leave it there. Slowly petering out...:

Adorno claims that you cannot find a global unifying theory which takes either global mechanisms or actual phenomena as the ultimate reality—neither Hegel nor the phenomenologists so to speak, taking the other way round, going from phenomena and authentic experience to its sedimentation. (From a Lacanian point of view there is not basic authentic experience). Adorno's solution: it's wrong to try to develop a global theory, because what we misperceive as a lack in our understanding of reality is the itself the actual experience of reality.

Zizek's critique of "alternate modernity" and alternative capitalisms: they want capitalism without paying the price. There was already an experiment in that line: Fascism. The Hegelian interpretation of the relationship between universal and particular here is close to Deleuze: the universal is a question, and the particulars are the answers. This is the way Marxists should assess capitalism: not responding to capitalism in general, but to specific modes of capitalism. The struggle is not between the particulars, the struggle is between the particulars and the universal, the particulars are possible answers to the deadlock caused by the general. This is what Hegel means by concrete universality—a struggle between universality and its particular content.

This lecture is followed by another one on The Interaction with the Other in Hegel (and in lots of parentethical digressions as well I guess).


La idea central de la Fenomenología del Espíritu